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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. WESLEY RASMUSSEN, 
DENNIS A. RASMUSSEN 
and 
RONALD W. RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 9892 
vs. 
WESTERN CASUALTY & 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN'T OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought 
by C. Wesley Rasmussen, Dennis A. Rasmussen and 
Ronald W. Rasmussen against Western Casualty 
1and Surety Company to determine whether a policy 
of insurance issued by the Western Casualty & 
Surety Company to C. Wesley Rasmussen and d/b/a 
Rasmussen Heating & Ventilating Company cover-
ed a certain automobile owned by Ronald W. Rlas-
mussen and operated by Dennis A. Rasmussen in 
connection with an automobile accident that oc-
curred near Preston, Idaho, on August 14, 19'59, and 
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whether said insurrance com'pany was obligated to 
defend any suit and pay any judgment in connec-
tion with certain actions brought against the Ras-
mussens as a result of said automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the 1a.Ction as filed Dale Barton, an individu-
al, and d/b/a Dale Barton Agency, was named as 
an additional defendant. (R 1-5) Answers were 
filed on behalf of both defendants. Thereafter the 
depositions of C. Wesley Rlasmussen and Ronald Vv. 
Rasmussen were taken. The defen~ant, Western 
Casualty & Surety Company, answered certain in-
terrogatories served by 1the plaintiffs. (R 12-15) 
Then the plaintiffs and the defendant, Western 
Oasualty & Surety Company, each moved for a sum-
mary judgment. (R 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25) Attached 
to the p~aintiffs' motion for a summary judgment 
was an affidavit of C. Wesley Rasmussen. (R 19-21) 
At the time of the hearing on the motion the policy 
of insurance together with other endorsements and 
1a copy of an auditor's report were admitted in evi-
dence along with copies of certain complaints in 
connection with actions brought against the plain-
tiffs as a result of the automobile accident. Dale 
Barton, individually and d/b/a Dale Barton Agency, 
was not involved in the summary judg1nent pro-
ceedings. On the basis of the pleadings and the mat-
ters herein stated the court denied the motion of 
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the Western Casualty & Surety Company for a 
summary judgment 1and granted the plaintiff's mo-
tion for a summary judgment in which the court 
adjudicated that the plaintiffs, C. Wesley Rasmus-
sen, and Dennis A. Rasmussen, were insured under 
the policy and that the defendant, Western Casualty 
& Surety Company, was obligated to defend any 
actions against them arising out of the automdb'ile 
accident and to pay any judgment which might be 
rendered. ( R 127-29) 
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL 
The defendant, Western Casualty & Surety 
Company, seeks a revel}sal of the judgment, 1and a 
judgment in its favor adjudicating 1that the policy 
of insurance was not in force and effect and did 
nat cover the vehicle involved in the accident afore-
said. 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, C. Wesley Rasmussen, through 
the Dale Barton Agency had taken out a policy of 
insurance with the Western Casualty & Surety Com-
pany bearing No. CGA604820 which Wtas a renewal 
of a previous policy and covered a period of one 
year from April 1, 1959 1to April 1, 1960. (Ex. 1) 
The policy was in the name of C. Wesley Rasmussen 
and d/'b/a Rasmussen Heating & Ventilating Com-
pany, Lehi, Utah County, Utah. It was denominated 
a comprehensive general automobile liability pol1icy. 
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This policy contained certain declarations, I tern 
3 of which reads as follows: 
"The insurance afforded is only with respect 
to such and so many of the following cover-
lages as are indicated by specific premium 
charge or charges. The limit of the company'8 
liability against each such coverage shall be 
as stated herein, subject to all the terms of 
this policy having reference thereto." 
Item 4 of the declarations indicated that the 
declarations were completed on certain schedules 
attached to the policy and referred to in I tern 4. 
Item 5 of the declarations reads as follows: 
"(a) The schedules disclose all haZJards in-
sured hereunder known to exist at the effec-
tive date of this policy. (b) The schedules 
contain a complete list of all automobiles and 
trailers owned by the named insured at the 
effective date of this policy and the purposes 
of use thereof. (c) The schedules contain a 
complete list of all persons within the defini-
tion of Class 1, persons, at the effective date 
of this policy. Exception, if any, to (a), l(b) 
or (c) ; No exceptions." 
The declaration attached to said policy and re-
ferred to in I tern 4 contains a list of owned auto-
mobiles which does not include the 1automobile that 
was involved in the accident. There is an audit 
sheet attached to the policy (Exhibit No. 1) indicat-
ing that there were no hired autos and no Class 1 
non-owned autos. This audit sheet is dat~d 5-11-60 
and bears the signature of C. Wesley Rasmussen. 
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The policy then provided that the insurance 
company: 
"Agrees with the insured, named in the dec-
larations made a part hereof, in consideration 
of the payment of the premium and in reli-
ance upon the statements in the decllarations 
and subject to fue limits of li1a:bility, exclu-
sions, conditions and other terms of this 
policy: 
1. Coverage A - Bodily 'Injury Liability 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as dramages because of bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, including death 
at any time resulting therefrom, sustained 
by any person and caused by accident." 
Under Insuring Agreement No. III, subdivision 
( 2) of said policy it was provided that said policy 
under the liability coverage protected ''any person 
while using an owned automobile or a hired auto-
mobile and any person or organization legally re-
sponsible for the use thereof, provided the 1actual 
use of the automobile is by the named insured or 
with his permi1ssion." 
Also, under Insuring Agreement No. III, the 
policy provided as follows: 
"'The insurance with respect to any person or 
organization other than the named insured 
does not apply under division (2) of this 
insuring agreement: 
* * * * (e) with respeet to rany non-owned auto-
mobile, to any executive officer if such auto-
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mobile is owned by him or a member of the 
same household." 
Under Conditions of said policy there were cer-
tain definitions included among which is the fol-
lowing: 
"(2) Hired Automobile-an automobile used 
under contract in behalf of, or loaned to, the 
named insured provided such automobile is 
not owned by or regi1stered in the n~ame of 
(a) the named insured or (h) an executive 
officer thereof or (c) an employee or agent 
of the named insured who is granted an oper-
ating allowance of any sort for the use of 
such automobile." 
I tern No. 2 of 'the Cond1 tionrs of said policy pro-
vides for an inspection and !audit permitting the 
company to inspect the automobiles and to examine 
and audit the insured's book!s. 
Under Item No. 1 of the Conditions of said 
policy the premium basis and rates for the hazards 
described in the Declarations is set forth. 
I tern No. ( 6) thereof defines ''cost of hire" and 
indicates the rate charged or to be charged for 
hired vehicles based upon the cost of hire of the 
automobile. 
At the time this policy was taken out the plain-
tiff, Ron'ald W. Rasmussen, was the owner of a 1950 
Chevrolet 2 door sedan which was the car that was 
involved in the accident, (Wesley's deposition, p 13, 
14). This car was registered and titled in Ronald's 
name (Wesley's deposition, p 14). It was undisputed 
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that Ronald carried his own liability and property 
dam1a;ge insurance on this car, (Wesley's deposition, 
p 14), with a company other than the Western Casu-
alty & Surety Company, (Wesley's deposition, p T5). 
At the time that the C. Wesley Rasmussen 
policy herein referred to was written Ronald was 
single and living a~t home with his parents. Ronald 
ha'd purchased this car from the Timpanogos Motor 
in 1956, (Ronald's deposition p 36), and during all 
of this time had personally carried his own liability 
and property damage insurance on 'this veh'icle, 
('Ronald's deposition p 36, 37), When he acquired 
the vehicle, he had a conversation with his :flather 
about taking out insurance on it. 'They both felt it 
advisable for him to take out insurance in his own 
name, (Ronald's deposi'tion, p 37). He did so 'and 
had it continuously insured for liability and proper-
ty dlamage thereafter until some time after he went 
on a mission for the Mormon Church on January 
26, 1959, (Ronald's deposi~ion, p 3'5, 37). He was 
sure it was insured in his own name with some 
other company when he went on his mission, (Ron-
ald's deposition, p 38). He left the insurance papers 
with his fafuer, ('Ronald's deposition, p 38), or at 
least left the insurance policy home, ( Ron1aid's 
deposi'tion, p 39). So far as Wesley knew Ronald left 
the insurance policy with him (Wesley deposition p 
2'7). In :fact he could have received some renewal 
papers on it (Wesley deposition p 27). 
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Ronald's mission was to be for two years. He 
left on January 26, 19'59, (Ronald's deposition, p 
35), and did not return until January of 1961, (R. 
20, Wesley's deposition, p 15). 
Wesley had had insurance wirth the Western 
Casualty and Surety Company through the Dale 
Barton Agency during all of the time that his son, 
Ronald, carried separate insurance policy on his 
own vehicle, (Wesley's deposition, p 6, 7) . When 
Ronald went on h1is mission, "he left the car with" 
his father, (Wesley's deposition, p 15, 16). 
Wesley admirtted tha:t :all the time his son, 
Ronald, had the car up until the 'time he left for 
his miss1ion it was insured with another company. He 
knew his son had it insured with another company 
and insisted on him doi'ng so while he had the car 
and was living at home with him as a member of 
His family, (Wesley's deposi1tion, p 24) . 
Wesley figured that Ronald's policy was in 
force at the time that he left but it may have lapsed 
thereafter and prior to the 'time of the automobile 
accident in which it was involved, (Wesley's deposi-
tion, p 16) . After Ronald left on his mission, the 
Rasmussen family used the car "wherever it was 
needed in the family," (Wesley's deposition, p 16). 
According to Ron'ald, when he left on his mission, 
he turned the car over 'to his father and his father 
was to have control of it. However, he did not change 
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the registration or ownership, (Ronald's deposition, 
p 39). At the time of the accident 'the car was being 
used "just as a family car" 'and for the convenience 
of the boys, (Wesley's deposition, p 19). 
From the time Wesley took out his first policy 
with Mr. Barton, Dale Barton or someone from his 
office each spring would come down and take a pay-
roll 'audit, (Wesley's deposition, p 8, 9) , and would 
comm unica:te with him regarding the vehicles to 'fie 
covered under the policy or 'any change's or elimina-
tions of the vehicles, (Wesley's deposition, p 20, 21). 
Wesley would tell Barton on these checks ''what 
cars I had," and what 'Cars he didn't have, '(Wes-
ley's deposition, p 21). The only source from which 
Barton could get information about c'ars to be in 
sured was from Wesley, '(Wesley's deposition, p '25, 
2) . He never discussed with Barton anything about 
his son Ronald's car or insurance or coverage for it 
until after the accident had occurre1d, (Wesley's 
deposition, p 18, 19, 21). 
After an audit WaJs taken, Barton would send 
it down for him to sign and he would do so. He 
didn't know whether any vehicles were listed on 
i't, (Wesley's deposition, p 20). 
An audit was completed on 4-27-5 9, some three 
months after Ronald had gone on his 'mis'sion, which 
was in'troduce'd in evidence a:nd marked Exhibit 
D-2. Thi's audit, among other things, showed cer-
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tain changes made in owned autos by deleting some 
owned cars and adding others, none of which in-
cluded Ronald's vehicle. The summary on the audit 
sheet further indicated that there were no hired 
autos. This audit sheet admi'tte'dly bore the signa-
ture of Wesley R'asmU!s'sen, CR. 41, Wesley's deposi-
tion, p 9) . Wesley understood that the purpose of 
the a udi~t was to determine the premi urn and the 
ha:sis of his coverage (Wesley's deposition, p 9). 
Wesley would not deny 'that the typewritten in-
formation on the audit sheet bearing hi's signature 
was on it at the time he signed it, (Wesley's deposi-
tion, p 10). When he got the endorsements he prob-
ably glanced 1through them (Wesley's deposition p 
28). 
Under date of May 8, 195'9, Dale Barton Agency 
wrote We1sley Rasmussen a:s f!ollows: (Wesley deposi-
tion, p 11, '12). 
"Rasmussen Heating and Ventilating Com-
pany, 
Lehi, U'tah. 
''Dear Wesley : 
"I ~talked with your wife about the li-
ability policy. It is the same as last year. The 
only difference is in the 19'57 Chevrolet pick-
up truck. Please give us the serl'al and motor 
number of this vehicle. 
'cAs you know, we are not carrying any 
coverage on collision or on fire or theft on 
the vehicles, but liability and property dam-
age. I am wondering whether you would want 
10 
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us to carry fire and theft, or col1i'sion insur-
ance on the pick-up and the other vehicles. 
This insurance cost is not great, and would be 
less than charged by the banks or by lending 
insti~tutions. 
''Would you please send the serial num-
ber to me, and call me collect if you 'de'Sire 
this office to inve'Stigate further the coverage 
of the veHicles. The ·coverage I refer to is the 
coll.i'sion and comprehensive on any of the 
vehicles you own. 
''We do need the 1serial number of the 
pick-up truck, 1and will appreciate your co-
operation in sending it in by merely jotting 
down the number on the second page of this 
letter. 
''Yours very truly, 
"Dale Barton Agency 
''By--------------------------------'' 
The signature is not shown, but 'the initials 
indicate it was signed by Dale Barton. 
This was 'the type of le'tter which Wesley Ras-
mussen admitted receiving after each audit, (Wes-
ley's deposition, p 12). 
Wesley had twin sons named Dennis A. and 
David Owen Rasmussen, (Wesley's deposition, p 
3). Some time after Ronald departed for his mission 
these two boys, who were then 16 years of age, · (W es-
ley''S deposition, p '13), were staying at Kenneth 
Porter's re'Sidence in Pre·ston, Idaho, where they 
were working for the summer, (Wesley':s deposition, 
11 
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p 17). Wesley had let them take the car up there to 
use, (Wesley's deposition, p 17). While they had 
the car with them and on the 14th day of August, 
1959, while it was being opera:ted by Dennis A. Ras-
mussen, who was then 16 years of age, it was in-
volved in a two car accident approximately 5.5 
miles north of Preston, Idaho, on U. S. Highway 
91, (Exhibits p 3, 4, 5). As 1a result of said accident 
a lawsuit was filed by Thelma Hatch and Wilder 
Hatch against Dennis A. Rasmussen, C. Wesley 
Rasmussen and Ronald W. Rasmussen in the State 
of Idaho, (Exhibit p 3). 'This lawsuit 'vas subse-
quently dismissed without prejudice, (R. '2), and was 
then re-filed in Utah County, State of Utah, (Exhi-
bit p 5), where said suit is now pending. 
As a further result of said accident, another 
lawsuit was filed in the State of Idaho, by the 
brothers and sisters of Ann1a Egbert against the 
Rasmussens, (Exhibit p 4). This latter lawsuit re-
sulted in a judgment against Dennis A. Rasmussen 
and Ronald W. Rasmussen alone in the sum of 
$573.75 and $90.00 court costs. No judgment was 
rendered against C. Wesley Rlasmussen, ( R. 3). 
The Western Oasualty and Surety Company 
claimed that Ronald's car was not covered under 
Wesley's policy and refused to take any action with 
reference to the accident in which the vehicle was 
involved. It also refused for the same reason to take 
12 
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over the defense of any of the l:awsuits. It was then 
that the summary judgment proceedings were in-
stituted. As against Dale Barton, it was claimed 
thla.t he was negligent in failing to include the ve-
hicle on the schedule and in representing to the 
plaintiff, C. Wesley Rasmussen, that the policy of 
Western Casualty and Surety Company insured 
Wesley and members of his family against any acci-
dent whatsoever. 
'The plaintiffs did not file 1any motion for sum-
mary judgment as against Dale 'Barton or the Dale 
Barton Agency, but only as ~against the Western Oas-
ualty and Surety Company. IThe plainltiffs and said 
insurance company are, therefore, the only persons 
or parties involved on this appeal. 
At the hearing on the motions for summary 
judgment as made and filed by the respective par-
ties the trllal judge took the position that the driver 
of the vehicle, Dennis Rasmussen, a:s well as C. 
Wesley Rasmussen were covered under the policy 
on the basis that Ronald's vehicle was a hired auto-
mobile. 'The court said: 
"THE CO U·R'T : I am going to hold that this 
fellow i'S covered. I have eaten crow before, 
and I can eat it again, but I think I had better 
interpret this policy to say tha:t he had 1a hired 
automobile. 
MR. STRONG: You are interpreting irt as a 
hired automobile? 
THE COURT: Yes. This loaned automobile I 
13 
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think is hired under that sense and that he 
was - the kid was driving with the insured's 
permission. Now, that should cover the kid, 
shouldn't it, this actual driver? 
M'R. STRONG: Well, I won't agree wi'th that. 
You can make that statement. 
THE COURT: I want to know now, does any-
body defend me? You 'are defending me? 
MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor, I will de-
fend you to the highest court in the nation 
as to Dennis being covered under that hired 
provision. 
THE COURT: You 1are like the fellow who 
says: 'I will stand back of you until your face 
is beat to a pulp.' 
MR. JACKSON: Precisely." (R. 45) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WESTERN'S POLICY DID NOT COVER THE AC-
CIDENT INVOLVING RONALD RASMUSSEN'S CAR. 
The Insuring Agreement No. 1 obligating the 
insurance company to pay on behalf of the insured 
all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily in-
jury sustained 'by any person and caused by acci-
dent is ~'subject to the limi'ts of liability, exclusions, 
conditions and other terms of this policy." ·The only 
pa:ssenger vehicle shown in the declarations schedule 
attache'd to the policy was the personal car of Wesley 
14 
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Rasmussen, namely, a 1951 Pontiac Sedan. Item 5 
of the policy specifically provided that the said 
schedule disclosed all hazards insured under the 
policy at the time of ithe effective date and ·the 1audits 
taken thereafter did not disclose any other passenger 
vehicles to be covered by the policy. 
An automobile policy only covers claims arising 
from a:ecidents in which the 1insured automobile is in-
volved. See 7 Appleman Insuliance Law & Practice, 
Section 4254, wherein it is said: 
"An automobile Ha:bili'ty policy will only 
cover casualties or claims of casualties, though 
groundless, arising from an accident in which 
the insured automobile is involved. Thus, one 
injured by the insured's negligent operation 
of an automobile of 1a different make than 
that described in the policy was not allowed 
to recover from the insurer. * * *" 
(A) WESLEY RASMUSSEN IN NO EVENT WAS 
OR COULD BE LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR THE AC-
CIDENT INVOLVING RONALD'S CAR. 
In the three lawsuits (Exhibits P-3, P-4 and 
P-5) Uta:h statutes pertaining to the signing by 
Wesley of Ronald's driver's license application and 
to Wesley's furnishing the car to Dennis to drive 
are relied upon. Section 41-2-10 of the Utah Code 
Annotated 195'3 provides in substance that a person 
who signs the application for license of 1a minor 
under 'the age of 18 years is jointly and severally 
liable with said minor for his negligence. Section 
15 
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41-2-2'2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 in substance 
provides that any person who gives or furnishes 
a motor vehicle to a minor under the 1age of 18 years 
shall be jointly and severally Hable with such minor 
for any damages caused by his negligence. The 
complaints allege that Wesley Rasmussen signed 
the 1application for license of Dennis Rasmussen. 
It appears from these complaints that the ac-
cident out of which these lawsuits arose occurred 
in the State of Idaho and not in the State of Utah. 
The Idaho statutes differ from the Utah statutes 
on which the plaintiffs in the three lawsuits afore-
mentioned rely. Section 49-1403 of the General Code 
of Idaho provides that any person who gives or 
furnishes a motor vehicle to a minor under the age 
of 16 years is jointly and seve~ally liable. The same 
is true as to an owner who knowingly permits such 
a minor to drive a vehicle. Such section reads as 
follows, to-wit: 
"Owner liable for negligence of minor 
under sixteen. Every owner of a motor vehicle 
causing or knowingly permitting a minor un-
der the age of 16 years to drive such vehicle 
upon :a highway, and any person who gives 
or furnishes a motor vehicle to such minor, 
shall be jointly and severally liable with such 
minor for any damage caused by the negli-
gence of such minor in driving such vehicle." 
In this case it is undisputed that Dennis Ras-
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mussen was not under the age of 16 years at the 
time of the accident. 
Section 49-307 of the General Code of Idaho 
provides that "no person except as herein exempted 
shall drive upon a highway in this state unless such 
person has a valid license." 
Section 49-308, subdivision 3, of the Gener1al 
Code of Idaho reads as follows: 
"A non-resident who is at least 16 years 
of age and who has in his immediate posses-
sion a valid operator's license issued to him 
in his home state or country may ope~ate a 
motor vehicle in this state only as an oper-
ator." 
'The U'tah statute pertaining ~to licensing only 
applies to the opera;tion of vehicles by 1a minor under 
the age of 18 on highways in the State of Utah. 
Section 41-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 195'3 speci-
fically so provides. It reads as follows: 
"No person except those expressly exemp-
ted under sections 41-2-3, 41-2-4, 41-2-7 1and 
41-2-13 (d) shall drive any mdtor vehicle 
upon a highway in this state unless such per-
son upon application has been licensed as an 
operator or chauffeur by the department un-
der the prov'is'ions of this act." (Italics ours) 
'The Idaho st1atute in permitting a non-r~sident 
mdtorist who is at least 16 years of age and has a 
valid operator's license from another state to oper-
ate a vehicle in Idaho does not require that the state 
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so issuing the license to the minor require that the 
minor have any financial responsibility or have 
anyone sign the license on hi:s behalf. A person who 
holds a license from a staJte m1aking no such require-
ments can operate a vehicle on the highways in the 
State of Idaho. Furthermore, as to non-residents 
the Idaho statute does not require that the father 
or any perBon signing the driver's license in the 
foreign state shall be jointly and severally l'ia:ble 
wi'th the minor. 
The only safeguard which the Idaho statute 
has in this regard is under Section 49-140'3 making 
any owner or any person who furnishes a minor 
under 16 years of age with a vehicle to drive jointly 
and severally Hable with said minor. 
In 1addition, Section 49-1404, subdivision (1) 
General Code of Idaho, reads as follows: 
"Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable 
and responsible for the death of or injury to 
a person or property resulting from negli-
gence in the operation of such motor vehi~le, 
in the business of such owner or otherwise, 
by any person. ~ing or opera:tin~ the. same 
with the permission, expressed or Imphed, of 
such owner, and the negligence of such per-
son shall be imputed to the owner for all pur-
poses of civil damages.'' 
Since the accident occurred in Idaho, the Utah 
statutes have no applicaJtion whatsoever. The right 
of action, if any, as against Wesley Rasmussen or 
18 
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anyone other than the driver, Ron1ald, is based on 
the Idaho statute and governed entirely thereby. See 
15 Corpus Juris Secundum, Conflict of Laws, Sec-
tion 4 at page 865, wherein it is s'ta;ted as follows: 
uThere is apparently no conflict in the 
decided cases on the point that so far as the 
right of action is concerned it must stand if 
at all on the statute of the state where the 
injury occurred and not of the state where 
the redress is sought, so that, if no cause of 
action is created at the place of wrong, no re-
covery can be had in any other state. So, 
where a statute of one state gives a right 
which did not exist at common law, and the 
statute conbains any condrtions or limitations 
which attached to the right itself as distin-
guished from the remedy, the same conditions 
and limitations will apply where the right 
is sought to be enforced by an action in an-
other state." 
See 1also 5 A Am. Jur. Section 613 'at pages 612 
and 613, wherein it is stated as follows: 
"Statutes imposing liability upon the 
o":ner of an 1automobile for its negligent oper-
ation by one 1to whom he en trust's the car not-
wi1thstanding absence of any relationship of 
agency or personal negligence on the part of 
the owner in entrusting his car to one incom-
petent to drive i~, alter the liability of tpe 
owner from what It was at common l1a.w. * * * 
A statute making the owner liable for in-
juries occasioned when the car is driven by 
his consent and declaring that where the car 
is driven by a member of his family consent 
shall be conclusively presumed, crea:t~s 1a sub-
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stantive rule of law, rather than a mere rule 
of evidence." 
See also 5 A Am. Jur. Section 614 ~a;t page 614 
wherein it is said: 
"Liability for injuries inflicted in the use 
of an automobile must be determined by the 
law of the place where the accident occurred, 
and a statute imposing liability upon an own-
er of an automobile for damage resu}ting from 
its negligent operation by one using it with 
his permission has no application to accidents 
happening in another state." 
In Kernan v. Webb ('R.I.) 148 A. 186, it was 
held that a Rhode Island statute making an owner 
liable for the negligent operation of a vehicle by 
another upon the public highways of the state had 
no extra-territori'al effect and did not come into 
operati'On until an accident happened on a public 
highway in Rhode Island. See also to the same effect 
Cherwein v. Geiter (N.Y). 5 N.E. ('2d) 185, where-
in it was held that a resident of Pennsylvania who 
loaned his ear to his son while visiting him in New 
York was not liable under the statute for an injury 
which occurred in New Jersey while the son was 
using the car. The court stated that the statute mak-
ing the owner liable for injuries while the car was 
being used by another did not fix the rights and li-
'aJbilities of persons using the public highways of 
other states. 'That was a matter of policy for each 
state to determine. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case it is undisputed that Wesley Ras-
mussen was not the owner of the car. He did, how-
ever, furnish the vehicle to Dennis. Under the a p-
plicable Idaho law Wesley Rasmussen is not liable 
for the opera:tion of the vehicle in the State of Idaho 
by his son, Dennis, since Dennis a:t the time of said 
accident was not under the age of 1'6 years. 
Wesley's policy in no event would cover him 
for liability tha1t might be imputed to him under 
the statute while his son was driving 1a vehicle that 
was not described in the policy. Imputed fi.'ability 
can only arise where a person is operating a vehicle 
tha:t is covered by the policy i'tself. See Wisdom, 
et al. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 27 CCH Automobile 
Oases C2d) p 1350, where it was held that a statu-
tory provision, limiting an operator's policy to cov-
erage of persons using non-owned vehicles, was con-
strued to provide on'ly for liability which the insured 
incurred directly and not for liability imputed to 
him. Thus, the insured's attempt to recover for li-
ability wHich he incurred when his son was involved 
in an accident while driving a non-owned rautomobile 
was barred. 
(B) UNDEH NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS RON-
ALD RA'S1MUS'SEN COVERED UNDER WESTERN'S 
POLICY. 
Even if Ronald's car be considered as a hired 
vehicle under Wesley's policy, Ronald, nonetheless, 
is not covered under Western's policy. It is speci-
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fically provided under Section III (d) of the Insur-
ing Agreements that "the insurance with respect 
to any person or organization other than the nramed 
insured does not apply * * * (d) With respect to 
any hired automobile, to the owner or a lessee there-
of other than the named insured, or to any agent 
or employee of such owner or lessee." Ronald Ras-
mussen is, therefore, definitely beyond the prdtec-
tion of the policy. 
(C) RONALD RASMUSSEN'S CAR WAS NOT A 
HIRED VE'HICLE WITHIN THE MEANING OF WES-
TERN'S POLICY. 
In defining the insured under the Insuring 
Agreement No. III of 'the policy it is provided that 
"any person while using an owned automobile or 
a hired automobile and any person or organization 
legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the 
actual use of the automobile is by the named insured 
or with his permission" is an insured. 
Under paragraph 3 (b) ( 2) a hired au1tomobile is 
defined as follows: 
'"An automobile used under contract in behalf 
of, or loaned to the named insured provided 
such automobile is not owned by or registered 
in the name of (a) the named insured, or 
(b) an executive officer thereof, or (c) an 
employee or agent of the named insured who 
is granted an operalting allowance of 'any sort 
for the use of such automobile." 
'The lower court as a basis for its decision held 
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tha:t Ronald's vehicle was a "hired vehicle" within 
the terms of the policy in the sense thla~t it was 
"loaned" 'to Wesley Rasmussen while Ronald was 
on a two year mission for the L.D.S. Church. 
In construing the policy the court must use the 
words in their proper context and meaning. See 
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Reece, 
(lOth Gircuilt) 5 CCH Automobile Cases ('2d) p 740 
a:t p 7 41, wherein the court says that '~'liabilities 
clearly not contemplated under a fair and re'asona:ble 
interpretation of the con!tract with its omnibus pro-
visions may not be imposed upon the contracting 
insurer." Also, on page 7 42 the court srays: 
"while it is true that the term 'used by the 
insured' may, by contractual ·agreement, in-
clude the operation or use by a ·third person 
for the benefit of the insured, * * * like any 
other con1tractual provision it ~is subject to in-
'terpreta tion in context." 
See also 7 Applem1an Insurance Law & Practice, 
Section 41291 at page 80, wherein it is said: 
"However, the courts will not deliberate-
ly stretch the coverage to include automobiles 
never so intended by the parties. In one case, 
for example, the pollicy contained a descrip-
tion of fourteen vehicles used and owned by 
the insured. The policy ·arranged for the pay-
ment of premi urns on the basis of vehicles 
listed in the policy. The truck in quesrtion was 
owned by an independent contractor and used 
by him in performing work by the insured. It 
was not reported to the insurer nor was a pre-
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mium paid upon it. The suit agains~t the in-
surer was dismissed by the trial court, and 
on appe~al this resuU was affirmed." 
A loan is described in S4 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum at page 656 as being "temporary, a tempor~ary 
l~tting for 'a temporary use." In Ballentine's Law 
Dictionary 'the term is defined as follows: 
"Loan for use - A contract by which one 
gives to andther the temporary possession and 
use df personal property and the latter agrees 
to return the same thing to him at a future 
'time, without regard for its use." (Italics 
ours) Sec. 1884 Oa1ifornia Civil Code. 
'The term "hire" has been defined as "a reward 
or compenS'a!tion paid for the possession or use of 
personalty", 40 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 402. 
It is the price agreed to be paid for the use of an 
article of personal property' in this instance an 
automobile. 
1The word "temporary" implies a period of 
time of relative shor1t duration, usually fixe'd by 
some early event. See Young v. Pavich, (Me.) 116 
A. 26, wherein the court cites with approval from 
Webster's New International Dictionary and Words 
and Phrases 1as follows: 
"Webster's New International Diction-
ary: ''Temporary; lasting for a time only; ex-
listing or continuing for a limited time; not 
permanent.' 
''Words and Phrases: 'Las'ting for a time 
only; existing or continuing for a limited 
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time; not of long duration; not perm:anent; 
transitory; changing; but a short time.' " 
( lltalics ours) 
A loan of money could e)Ctend over a relatively 
long period of time. However, a loan of an auto-
mobile as it is genefially underS'tood 'and accepted 
in common ordinary language is for a relatively 
short period of time involving a few days or a week 
or two, certainly not for a period of two years. 
Under Western's policy in this case we are 
dealing primarily with a hired automobile which by 
definition includes a loaned ~automobile. Other provi-
sions in the policy indicate tha:t a premium is charg-
ed in connection with the use of hired automobiles 
as heretofore indicated in the statement of facts. The 
term "hire" and particul'arly the term '''loan" would 
indicate a temporary situation involving a relatively 
short period of time. In order to reach the result 
which it did in this case the lower court had to hold 
that the vehicle was being loaned out as a hired ve-
hicle for !a period of two years. This was a year 
longer than the policy period itself. It is undisputed 
that no premium was ever paid on Ronald's car. 'The 
audit report attache'd to the policy (Exhibit No. 1) 
so shows and 1the plaintiffs have never contended 
that they paid any premium to cover this automo-
bile. 
It becomes even more difficult to consider this 
vehicle 'as a loaned vehicle under the policy when it 
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is admitted that Wesley Rasmussen's own personal 
vehicle was covered under the policy and that after 
Ronald's vehicle was allegedly loaned to him for a 
two year period, it was considered and used 'as a 
family car and subsequently furnished Ito the two 
younger boys to take with them and use during the 
summer while they were employed in Idaho. If this 
vehicle be considered as a hired vehicle under the 
policy, then lfue insured, Wesley Rasmussen, was 
having two family cars and only paying a premium 
on one. IThis line of reasoning, if followed to its 
logical conclusion, could lead to some rather absurd 
results. For instance, each of lthe three Rasmussen 
boys could own cars; each could loan the car to his 
father for the entire policy peri'Od; the fiather could 
let another son drive each car during the entire 
policy period and under the court's interpretartion 
in such event all of tjhe drivers and the insured would 
be covered on all three vehicles as well as the in-
sured's own private passenger car for the entire 
period of the policy. We submit that no such absurd 
result was ever intended or should be considered by 
this court. 
A loan of an automobile within the meaning of 
an automobile policy certainly has no application 
to a siltuaJtion where 1a person having a family car 
allegedly is loaned another vehicle likeWise to be 
used for family purposes in conjunction with his 
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own vehicle and continues to operate both vehicles 
over a period of years. Furthermore, since Ronald's 
car was left for family use, it could just as well be 
considered 1as loaned to the driver, Dennis, as to 
the father, Wesley, and in such event it certainly 
would not be covered under Wesley's policy. 
There are other reasons which we will consider 
separately which to us conclusively indicate that this 
was not a hired autom()bile under the terms of the 
policy. 
(1) IT WAS NOT INDICATE'D ON THE POLICY 
OR IN ANY OF THE AUDIT SHEETS AS A HIRED 
VEHICLE. 
By reference to the policy itself and 1the sche-
dules aJttached thereto including the 1audi t report, 
the vehicle was nowhere listed therein as either an 
owned vehicle, a hired vehicle, or under any other 
description. In fact, under 1the audit sheet attached 
to the policy it is specifically indicated that there 
were no hired 1autom'Obiles. 
Exhibit D-2 contained an audit report which 
was completed on 4-2'7 -59 and was signed by Wesley 
Rasmussen. This audit report was ·taken after Ron-
ald had departed for his mission 1and Wesley had 
the car in his possession. lit was also taken prior to 
the time that the accident occurred. This 'audi1t did 
not show Ronald's vehicle as being included therein 
under any description and specifically indicated that 
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there was no hired automobile. Wesley Rasmussen 
in his deposition admitted that at no time did he ever 
request that the vehicle be included in his policy or 
m1ake any mention of the same to the Dale Barton 
Agency. It further appears that no premium was 
ever paid for any coverage on Ronald's automobile 
under Western's policy. 
Had the title to the vehicle been in Wesley R1as-
mussen's name, then the insurance company's 'audit 
may have caught ilt, but with the title in Ronald's 
name the only source from Which Western could 
obtain any information that coverage was desired 
on this vehicle would be from Wesley Rlasmussen 
himself. In fact, Wesley so admitted in his deposi-
tion. He should not be permitted 'to in effect mislead 
the company and then after an accident occurred 
and ~a loss was involved, seek to have the vehicle in-
cluded in his own policy. Had he desired to do so, 
he could probably have arranged to have the vehicle 
covered in some manner by payment of a specific 
premium therefror. 
(2) RONAIJD RASMUSSEN'S VEHICLE WAS 
NEVE'R CONSIDERED BY THE PARTIES TO THE 
'POLICY TO BE A HIRED VEHICLE WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE POLICY. 
From the time Ronald first purchased the ve-
hicle in 1956 until some time after he departed for 
his mission in J~anuary of 19'519 he had the vehicle 
continuously covered for liabililty and property d~m-· 
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1age insurance with a company other than Western. 
He dfd so after conferring with his fa:ther 1and being 
advised to take out a separa:te policy. 'The insured, 
Wesley Rasmussen, by requesting his son to obtain 
separate insurance fully recognized "thaJt 'the car 
was not covered under his own policy. It is unfor-
tunate that Wesley Rasmussen overlooked the pay-
ment of the renewal premium on th1is car, but this 
should not make Western liable. 
Wesley admitted {h!a:t each spring he would 
confer with Dale Barton regarding vehicles to be 
adde'd or deleted from the policy for the purpose of 
determining the vehicles that were to be covered 
thereby. He adm'itted 1tha!t at no time had he ever 
said anything to Dale Barton 1rubout his son's auto-
mdbile even after Ronald went on his mission. In 
fact, Ronald's car was never mentioned until after 
the accident had occurred and apparently after 
Wesley Rasmussen discovered thaJt Ronald's own 
policy had 'been allowed to lapse. 
Wesley Rasmussen in his conversrations with 
Dale Barton indicated th!~t he did not Tiave any 
Hired vehicles and this information was subsequent-
ly included in the audit sheets and reports, two 
of Which are exhibits in this case and are signed 
by Wesley Rasmussen. 'The last such paper was after 
Rorrald had gone on his mission and before the acci-
dent, clearly indicating that even as of that date an'd 
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after the ear had been left wi'th him, that Wesley 
did not consider irt to be a hired automobile under 
his own policy. 
(3) RON.A!LD RA8MUSSE'N'S CAR WAS EX-
CLUDED FROM COVERAGE BY WESTERN'S POLICY. 
Under Insuring Agreement No. liT (e) it is 
provided that the insurance does not apply "with 
respect 'to any non-owned au!tomobile, to any execu-
tive officer if such automobile is owned by him or 
a member of ~he same household." It is undisputed 
that the autom'dbile involved in the 'accident was 
owned by Ronald. Insofar 1as Wesley was concerned 
it was, therefore, a non-owned automobile. 
Even though Ronald had departed for and was 
on his mission 1aJt the time of the accident, he was 
nonetheless a member of Wesley's household within 
the meaning of the policy. See 7 Appleman Insur-
ance Law & Practice, Section 4411 at page 391, 
wherein i't is stated: 
"* * * The insured was held to remain a mem-
ber of the household during his military ab-
sence, 1and hence an injury sustained by his 
brother when the insured was home on fur-
lough was ndt covered under a policy exclud-
ing members of the household from coverage. 
* * *" Senn v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. 
Co., 1956, 287 S.W. (2d) 4'39, 5 CCH Auto-
mobile Oases ('2d) 1517. 
Absence from home while on a mission is no 
different than such absence While in the military 
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service. In either event, one still remains a member 
of the household of his parent if he is a minor and 
unmarried. Therefore, in any event Ronald's vehicle 
was not covered under the policy because it was 
owned by a member of the insured's household and 
was expressly excluded from the coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The m1aterial before the court at the hearing 
on the Motions for Summary Judgment conclusively 
and as a m·atter of law indica:ted that Ronald's car 
was not covered under Western's policy, nor was 
it a hired vehicle within the meaning of that policy. 
It was never considered by either of the parties to 
the contract to be a hired vehicle. On the contrary, 
Ronald Rasmussen and Wesley Rasmussen by their 
action and conduct both considered the same not 
to be ~a hired vehicle. It is, therefore, respectfully 
submitted that the decision of the lower court should 
be reversed, the summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs vacated and a summary judgment entered 
in favor of the defendant, Western Casualty and 
Surety Company, adjudicating that the policy did 
not cover the automobile involved in the accident 
and 'that the insurance company, therefore, had no 
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responsibility for any matter including lawsuits 
arising out of said accident. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
604-610 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, U'tah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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